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Meditation is a timeless practice and experience. This is what gurus,
pundits, and enthusiasts have been telling us for decades.1 And our
Zeitgeist衾 so heavily in-formed by New Age presuppositions衾 has fallen
in love with the appraisal. We have granted meditation a privileged locus in
our mental landscape viewing it as a ‘singularity’ where (trans-)
psychological forces work in different, even mysterious, ways. Deep
contemplative experiences and the philosophical conclusions which they
yield are beyond history. Or are they?…
This paper irreverently argues for a different view. Meditation is, I
believe, as historical and as prone to interpretative fiddling as any other
human act and product. How do I know it? I’m not a meditation enthusiast,
let alone a guru or a pundit, but I have a better source of knowledge: the
Buddhist sources themselves, though admittedly not in a straightforward
manner. In spite of the much-favoured strategy of preaching ad hominem,
epitomised by the ideal of skilful means (upāya), as well as of the
inclusivistic approach seen in numerous Buddhist sources, it cannot be
denied that there are countless statements about the Teaching, practice
included, made sub specie aeternitatis.2
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1 See, for instance, ‘[…] the yogic experience of a timeless, utterly detached,
transic peace was an important ingredient and determinant of the Buddhist
conception of Nibbāna; that is, it is an experience-produced doctrine’ (King 1992,
VII). Also cf. the title of Sayadaw U Pandita’s book: Timeless Wisdom: Teachings on
the Satipatthana Vipassana Meditation Practice.
So if it’s not the primary sources per se which deny the changeless,
timeless nature of meditation, how do I know it? To be more precise, my
conclusions are the result of an analysis based upon a philologico-historical
methodology and historicist premises. Does such an analysis ensure a more
‘objective’ understanding of the subject? Since I adopt it, I obviously believe
so. Whoops! This already smells of circular judgement…. The problem of
proof is beyond the scope of this paper, but I shall frankly admit that to a
(hopefully tolerable) degree, circularity is present in this as in many
(most?) other judgements. I also admit that the philologico-historical
methodology cannot ensure the same objectivity as mathematical truths,
not even guarantee the uniformity of conclusions. My findings will
therefore be unavoidably contaminated by a dose a subjectivity. Hopefully,
it is not such as large as the dose of subjectivity in judgements relying on
personal experience, feelings, unchecked hearsay, and (worst!) wishful
thinking.
This said, what does my philologico-historical approach reveal? Similarly
named or described contemplative techniques and states are not
necessarily construed and evaluated identically. Different texts confront us
with different definitions, interpretations, even technical advice for what
superficially appear to be similar practices.3 From a historicist perspective,
this hardly comes as a surprise. Texts, sacred or profane, are authored and
redacted by flesh-and-blood human beings. No matter how skilled in
meditation, how versed in contemplative psychology they may have been,
these people lived and expressed their conclusions under the constraints of
their age (as actually everyone else, including scientists, empirical
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2 For more details, see Addendum I.
3 To some, if not many, readers, this may seem a matter a fact, but it is quite
difficult to prove it independently of empiric ‘common-sense’ criteria. This is not,
however, the place to engage in a philosophical discussion on the validity of
methodological presuppositions.
philosophers, and historians).
When the divergences in the theory and praxis of meditation are wide
enough, we can speak of paradigm shifts. In this paper, I identify and focus
on four such paradigm shifts in the history of Yogācāra Buddhism.4 I shall
call them (1) ‘subsumption’, (2) ‘inversion’, (3) ‘augmentation’, and (4)
‘substitution’.
1. Subsumption
Imagine for a moment you are a meditation devotee somewhere in
Northern India around the middle of the 3rd century C.E. As luck (or rather
karma) would have it, you will encounter a Buddhist contemplative
thoroughly versed in spiritual cultivation (yoginā yogajñena). After being
enquired about your motivation and judged to be well beyond the regular
monastic dabbler, you will be encouraged to focus on the benefits of the
meditative training. ‘Very well, good Sir! (sadhu, sādhu, bhadramukha)’,
the master will say, ‘whilst [ordinary people] are shackled to passion,
aversion, and bewilderment, thou wishest to break these [very] shackles’.
Our kind-hearted expert will thereupon instruct you on five points
(pañcasu sthānes
̇
u), to wit, guarding and accumulating the requisites





vivekya), mental focusing (cittaikāgratā), purification from hindrances
(āvaran
̇
avi uddhi), and cultivation of contemplation (manaskārabhāvanā).
The last point includes five basic techniques, i.e. meditating upon the
impure (a ubhā), friendliness (maitrī), dependent origination (idam
̇
praty-
ayatāpratītyasamutpāda), analysis of elements (dhātuprabheda), and
Reshaping Timelessness (Deleanu) 3
― 374 ―
4 Such patterns of re-interpretation are not limited to Yogācāra in particular or
Buddhism in general. They can be found in many, if not most, spiritual traditions.
Again, this is not the place to attempt a comparative survey.
mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasmr
̇
ti). The master will assign you one of
these methods depending on the defilement dominating your psychological
profile. To boost your training, he may also initiate you into practice of the
four absorptions (dhyāna) and four immaterial attainments (ārūpyasamā-
patti).
Many familiar with early Yogācāra sources will have recognised that
this fictional scenario is based upon the 3rd century treatise rāvakabhūmi.5
And in one form or another, most of the techniques above are traceable to
canonical sources and later became adopted as basic meditative recipes in
many Buddhist traditions.6 Details aside, we can assume that this must
have been how a neophyte was trained in the early ascetic communities.
Kindly indulge me a little longer with our imaginary Dharma trip and
try to picture yourself putting every drop of energy into the meditative
methods you learned under the rāvakabhūmi master. And do it year after
year in the wilderness, far away from the madness of civilisation
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5 For the first paragraph of this section, I have relied on ŚrBh-TG #22, 10-12.
Much of my presentation cum partial translation comes from the following passage:
evam
̇







































(1) ŚrBh-TG #22 reads °bandhitāyām. I prefer the ŚrBh-MS reading. Skt.
°bandhita° has a causative meaning (see MW s.v.) which does not make
sense here. (I am grateful for this suggestion to Professor Emeritus Dr.
Lambert Schmithausen.)
The phrase ‘ [the master] instructs [the novice] on five points’ (pañcasu
sthānes
̇
u vinayate) occurs at id. 28.4.
The exposition of these points forms the content of the rest of Yogasthāna III.
The practice of the absorptions and attainments is detailed in the Laukikamārga
Chapter of Yogasthāna IV (for edition, translation, and study, see Deleanu 2006).
6 For more details, see Addendum II.
(monasteries, included…). One day you will decide to check out the results
of your arduous training and return to the benevolent rāvakabhūmi
master. But alack, much to your chagrin, impermanence took its toll and he
has passed away. The only meditation studio (as well as the latest rage) in
the ascetic community follows a new ‘curriculum’: the Bodhisattvabhūmi.7
Since it looks pretty close to what you have been practising, you decide to
give it a go.
But your first meditation session will be a bombshell! You’ll be stunned
to learn that you got it wrong! The only consolation may be that you’re not
the first one. Generation after generation of contemplatives who have
followed the traditional paradigm have committed the same error. But
don’t worry! The Bodhisattvabhūmi master will teach you how to fix the
mistake:
The path of (preliminary) practice8 shall be correctly followed in
order to eliminate this [i.e. ideation (sam
̇
jñā)]. Through thine
understanding (buddhi) which carefully (su°) investigates (vicārita°)
all objects of knowledge and by [keeping in mind] the ideation that all
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7 Both rāvakabhūmi and Bodhisattvabhūmi are now included in the encyclo-
paedic Yogācārabhūmi. For details concerning formation and dating, see Deleanu
2006, 147-247.
8 Or simply: ‘path of practice’. In many contexts, prayoga seems to be virtually
identical with yoga or ‘practice’. The Bodhisattvabhūmi itself (BoBh-W 81.18-21;
BoBh-D 58.19-21) defines prayoga in general terms, i.e. continuous and arduous




u). But we also know that in a more
technical sense, typical of Abhidharma scholastics, prayogamārga is construed as
‘path of preliminary practice’ (e.g. AKBh 320.14). Such a use must have also been
known to the Bodhisattavabūmi authors. Actually, here we have the compound
prayogamārga rather than prayoga. All things considered, it is hard to decide
whether our passage employs prayogamārga as a generic term for ‘method of
meditative training’ or in its specialised sense of ‘preliminary phase of practice’.
[other] ideations of phenomena (dharma) are adventitious,9 thou shalt
thus repeatedly remove all ideations [conducive to] the proliferation
(prapañca) of any phenomena whatsoever10 and shalt consistently
dwell on the thing [-in-itself] by means of a non-conceptualising
(nirvikalpa°) mental state which functions by grasping only the object
without characteristics (nirnimitta°). Thou shalt thus attain [a state
of] mental focus [which stems] from the lineage of the pure
contemplation of the Tathāgata Supreme Cognition. Thou shalt not
relinquish (mā riñcis
̇
yasi) this mental orientation (manasikāra°)
[even] when practising meditation upon the impure. [Likewise,] thou
shalt not relinquish this very mental orientation [even] when
practising meditation upon friendliness, dependent origination, analy-
sis of elements, mindfulness of breathing, the first absorption [and so
on] up to the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation [as well as]
































9 Literally, ‘by the ideation of adventitious[ness] directed at the ideations of all
phenomena’.
10 Literally, ‘[directed] at all phenomena’.
11 Cf. D Wi 203b2-5; T 30.572a3-14. Parts of the same passage are translated into
Japanese in Hotori 1984, 91-92.
12 BoBh-D adds evam
̇
te after buddhyā.
13 BoBh-D reads nirvikāren
̇
a. See, however, Tibetan rendering rnam par mi rtogs
pa’i sems (D Wi 203b2) and Chinese translation 無分別 […] 之心 (T 30.572a6).
14 Wogihara reads °tasmim
̇
. Tibetan reads de (D Wi 203b3) while Chinese renders
此 (T 30.572a7). Both Wogihara and Dutt readings are possible, but I prefer the
latter.














































And if you think this is a brand-new development, the Bodhisattvabhūmi
master will stun you again. This衾 he will stress衾 is a timeless recipe set
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15 BoBh-W: °jñānā°.
16 Ch. 無倒心一境性 suggests ＊aviparītā cittasyaikāgratā. Tib. reads together with
the Skt., i.e. without ＊aviparītā.
17 Both Nanjio and Dutt read: enam
̇
. I suggest the emendation above with some




is the correct reading.
Neither Vedic Skt. nor Pān
̇
ininan Skt. admit of ena at the beginning of a sentence
(see Wackernagel and Debrunner [1954] 1987, Vol. III, 523-526; PW I 1097-8, s.v.;
MW 232, s.v.; Speijer [1886] 1988, 205; Gotō 2013, 71), but in the less strict varieties of
the language, such as Epic Skt. (‘un language à pureté amoindrie, ouvert aux facilités
qui entraîne l’exercise d’un idiom populaire’, Renou 1956, 104), the restriction can be
ignored, albeit often for metrical reasons (as Hopkins said, ‘metre surpasses





a-pp), the rule no longer holds good (Edgerton [1953] 1985, Vol. I, 117,





a Sanskrit), then the emendation is not necessary. The issue is,
however, further complicated by the fact that at the end of the passage above, we
see etam eva manasikāram
̇
, which in spite of its different syntactic structure, pleads
for the emendation to etam
̇
. A definitive conclusion will be possible only after a
thorough investigation into the use of the pronoun in the manuscript witnesses of the
BoBh in particular and Buddhist literature (especially full- and quasi-Buddhist




19 BoBh-W 396.12-25; BoBh-D 273.15-24. For the Tibetan translation of the
passage, see D Wi 203b2-5. Xuanzang’s 玄奘 Chinese rendering is found at T
30.572a3-12.
forth by the past, present, and future Tathāgatas for the benefit of the
novice bodhisattva (bodhisattvam ādikarmikam).20 As for your Śrāva-
kayāna past, don’t fret about it! ‘Even the followers of the Disciples’ Vehicle
who practise by means of this mental orientation will quickly become more
proficient in supernatural faculties and reach the realisation of [the essence










From a historicist perspective衾 pace the Bodhisattvabhūmi author(s)
衾we have here a paradigm shift in the interpretation as well as practice of
meditation. Traditional techniques become subsumed under a new model
of praxis tailored to suit a new philosophical agenda. Meditating on the
impure, etc. is not altered in its main framework, let alone discarded. But all
perceptive data yielded by these traditional exercises are now governed by
a higher perceptive filter categorising them as ‘adventitious’ and prodding
cognition into a ‘non-conceptual mental state’ which gives access to the
thing-in-itself (vastumātra), the epistemic and soteriologic ideal of the
Bodhisattvabhūmi.22
2. Inversion23
Another interpretative strategy is the reversed evaluation of what appear
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20 See BoBh-W 397.2-5; BoBh-D 273.24-274.2.
21 BoBh-W 397.5-7; BoBh-D 274.2-3.
22 For more details on the epistemological ideas and spiritual praxis of the
Bodhisattvabhūmi, see Deleanu 2013.
23 This section was inspired by Schmithausen 2007, whose insights brought to my





ī passages discussed below (see Schmithausen 2007, mainly pp. 223-224; 233-234).
More on the meditative practices in these texts is found in Schmithausen’s
outstanding study (2007). Deleanu 2012 also gives a detailed presentation of the path
of spiritual cultivation in the rāvakabhūmi.
to be similar meditative experiences. One example is provided by a
rāvakabhūmi passage detailing the so-called supramundane path (lokot-
taramārga). This arduous spiritual process includes a step where the yogi
must focus on the mind itself as the object of meditation. In the peculiar
terminology used the text, this is part of the contemplation leading to





In order to eliminate the existential conceit or notion of a Self
(asmimāna), which prevents the mind from staying firmly riveted to the
ultimate goal of Nirvān
̇
a, the contemplative turns his/her concentration
towards mind itself. He/she25 gradually gains direct insight into the fact
that the mind, too, is impermanent, conducive to suffering, empty, and no
(n)-Self.26 Eventually, as the Self-notion is discarded (asmimānam
̇
prahāya), the yogi reaches a trance-like state in which the mind appears to
have no object (anālambana), to have ceased (vigata) altogether into
complete calmness (pra ānta).27
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24 ŚrBh-Sh 495.15-502.14. The mastery of this contemplation is explained as
corresponding to the attainment of the supreme mundane factors (laukikā
agradharmāh
̇






25 Many, if not most, of the traditional Indian sources, Buddhism included, usually
employ only masculine forms (‘he’, ‘his’, etc.) when speaking of contemplatives. Seen
from the paradigm of our age, such a usage is sexist. One should, however, add that
there are also traditional sources clearly referring to female meditators, too (see, for
instance, the examples analysed in Silk 2000). The monastic Order of nuns likewise
attests to the fact that women were not barred from spiritual praxis. I shall try to
reflect the gender duality in my descriptions of the accounts, but as far as the
translations from the originals are concerned, I shall use only masculine forms. This
should be understood as an attempt to stay close to the conventions of the traditional
wording rather than making sexist assumptions.
26 ŚrBh-Sh 497.3-499.12.
27 tasya tac cittam
̇
tasmin samaye niruddham iva khyāti, na ca tan niruddhaṁ
bhavati. anālambanam(1) iva khyāti, na ca tad ‹an› ālambanam
̇
bhavati.(2) tasya tac
But this is only a temporary experience. Neither the vanishing of the
object nor the complete calmness are ever-lasting. There are, however,
some people 衾 the rāvakabhūmi adds 衾 who are slow-witted (manda°),
deluded (momūha°), and conceited (abhimāna) enough to take this state to
be the very realisation (abhisamaya) of the Four Noble Truths.28 Wrong!
衾 the text warns us. The first actual insight into the Noble Truths 衾 the
rāvakabhūmi continues 衾 occurs after the emergence from this trance.
This is a moment of non-conceptual (nirvikalpa) cognition based on direct
perception (pratyaks
̇
ajñāna) which brings into full effect the certain
knowledge (ni cayajñāna) associated with the highest spiritual realisation
(abhisamaya).29
The rāvakabhūmi doesn’t tell us who the slow-witted are, but a
similarly ‘deluded’ interpretation of an apparently kindred state is




needless to say (at least for specialists), is part of the same encyclopaedic
treatise Yogācārabhūmi which includes the rāvakabhūmi itself. In tune
















(1) ŚrBh-Sh reads: […] samaye khyāti niruddham iva, na ca tan niruddhaṁ
.
bhavaty anālambanam […], which seems to be a misplacement cum mis-
punctuation. (I am indebted to Prof. Schmithausen for bringing this detail to
my attention.)
(2) ŚrBh-Sh and ŚrBh-MS read: na ca tadālambanam
̇
. The emendation is based
on Ch. and Tib. See also Schmithausen 2007, 223, n. 38. The general purport of
the passage also makes the emendation necessary.
28 ŚrBh-Sh 500.4-6.
29 ŚrBh-Sh 500.6-17.
30 The passage in question comes from the Bodhisattvabūmivini caya, the
exegetical section on the Bodhisattvabhūmi. For more detailed references, see
below.
eradication of the conceptual knowledge (vikalpa) and its replacement
with correct knowledge (samyagjñāna) giving access to the Supreme
Reality (tathatā).31 As imperfectly as words can approximate this trans-




ī definition of it:
What is the pure Essence of Phenomena (dharmadhātu)?32 It is the
Supreme Reality (tathatā) [attained] through the cultivation (bhāva-
nā) of the correct knowledge (samyagjñāna) which has eliminated all
images of appearances (nimitta).
(chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa gang zhe na | yang dag pa’i shes pa bsgom pa
la brten nas mtshan ma thams cad bsal33 bas de bzhin nyid gang yin pa ste |)34




ī, nimitta refers to the world of appearances,
i.e. the diversity of phenomena conceptually constructed (vikalpita) by
ordinary sentient beings.35 The experience of Supreme Reality seems to
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31 The Supreme Reality is equated by the text with the ineffable thing-in-itself
(vastu). See VinSam-K 69, § 2.4.; VinSam-Ta 121, § 1.2.4; VinSam-Ch: T30.696a4-5.
Let us also note that in this passage the Sanskrit terms in brackets are




ī has mostly survived only in Tibetan and
Chinese translations. Since the mūla-text is, however, extant in Sanskrit, too, we can
be fairly sure that many of these reconstructions reflect the original.
32 Ch.: 法界清淨 ‘purification [/purity] of the dharmadhātu’.
33 C, D: bsal; G, N, P: gsal. I read here with the C, D stemma (as Kramer 93 and





ī, Kramer ed. 93, § 3.5.2.4.1. Cf. VinSam-Ch: 云何名為 法界
清淨？謂：修正智故，永除諸相 證得真如。(T 30.701c4-5).
35 In our text, nimitta is defined as the thing (vastu) which serves as the basis of
the verbal expression (see VinSam-K 69, § 2.1.; VinSam-Ta 121, § 1.2.1). The latter is
a misleading epistemic tool when it comes to expressing the Supreme Reality. The
original Sanskrit presupposed by Tib. mtshan ma in the passage cited here is most
likely nimitta as also suggested by Ch. 相. But this raises a problem since nimitta in
its technical sense is rendered into Tib. as rgyu mtshan. (The Chinese translation
imply the complete lack of mental images or, in other words, the absence of
discrete cognitive objects (anālambana), which sounds similar to the state
described in the rāvakabhūmi passage cited above. This comes as no





ago declared the samādhi leading to the realisation of the sameness of all
phenomena (sarvadharmasamatā) to be the ‘king of contemplations’
(samādhirāja).36
It is, however, striking that (what later became) two sections of the
same text give different evaluations to a more or less similar contemplative




ī, the undifferentiated, objectless
experience is identified with the realisation of the Supreme Reality while
the rāvakabhūmi considers it a preliminary (albeit important) step





ī also speaks of the discernment of the Four Truths,
but this is a phase subsequent to the objectless experience of the Supreme
Reality. Answering an opponent who points out that the realisation of the
Four Truths preached by the Buddha implies conceptual discernment
(Skt. ＊parivitarkayati;37 Tib. yongs su rtog par byed; Ch. 分別), i.e. reflective
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remains, however, 相.) Tib. mtshan ma used in our passage suggests rather the
commoner meaning of nimitta as ‘characteristic’ or ‘mental image’ (in meditation,
etc.). It is hard to know why the Tibetan translators decided to differentiate here (an
interpretative rendering meant to underline the precise nuance of the word in this
context?). But even if we read the term in the sense of ‘characteristic’ or ‘mental









aPp-V 259.18. See also various other samādhis directed








aPp-V 259. Cf. ‘due to the










259.4). See also DaBh-K 96; DaBh-D 47, § A (describing the sixth stage on the
bodhisattva’s path). Let also note here that the Da abhūmikasūtra exerted a
noticeable influence on the formation of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, which also cites from
the text (for more details, see Deleanu 2013).
mode of cognition accompanied by objects/characteristics (＊sanimitta;





The pure cognition, both mundane and supramundane, regarding the
[Four Noble] Truths is achieved through the power of cognition
without mental images (＊animittajñāna; mtshan ma med pa’i shes pa;
無相智). Thanks to this [power], the afflictions (kle a) are [also]
eliminated. Therefore, the cognition without mental images衾which is
the cause of the cognition regarding the [Truth of] Suffering, etc. as
well as of the elimination of the afflictions 衾 38 is figuratively
designated (＊upacāra; nye bar gdags pa; 假 説) as the cognition
regarding the [Truth of] Suffering, etc. [like] in cases of naming the
result for [/instead of] the cause.39 Hence, there is no error [as
assumed by the opponent].
(bden pa rnams la ’jig rten pa dang ’jig rten las ’das pa’i shes pa rnam par dag pa
ni mtshan ma med pa’i shes pa’i dbang gis byung ba yin pa’i phyir | de nyid kyis
nyon mongs rnam par spangs pas na mtshan ma med pa’i shes pa sdug bsngal la
sogs pa’i shes pa’i rgyur gyur pa nyon mongs pa spong bar byed pa gang yin pa de
nyid la rgyu la ’bras bu gdags pa byas nas sdug bsngal la sogs pa shes par40 nye
bar gdags pas nyes pa med do ||)41
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37 Or ＊parikalpate.
38 Literally, ‘and brings about the elimination of afflictions’.
39 This is an instance of the logical method of superimposing the name of the result
upon the cause (hetau phalopacārah
̇
). (I am grateful to Prof. Schmithausen for this
detail.)





ī, Kramer ed. 92-93, § 3.3.4. The Chinese translation








ī, the objectless cognition is the actual
experience of Awakening while the reflective cognition of the Four Truths,
often presupposed by the traditional approach, is derived from it. Roughly
speaking, this is an inversion of the place and importance given to more or
less similar meditative experiences.42
3. Augmentation
The passage I have chosen to illustrate the augmentative strategy
represents a milestone in the history of Buddhist philosophy. It is probably
the earliest attested statement of the representation-only (vijñaptimātra-
tā) doctrine, which marks the birth of the Yogācara-Vijñānavāda as a
distinct philosophical school. The so-called vijñaptimātra(tā) passage43
occurs in the Maitreya Chapter (＊Maitreyaparivarta) of the Sam
̇
dhinirmo-
canasūtra, a text most probably compiled in first half of the 4th century.44
The entire chapter is dedicated to the path of spiritual cultivation, basically
framed upon the practice of tranquillity ( amatha) and insight (vipa yanā).
But let us first take a look at an earlier passage which may have paved
the way for the birth of the vijñaptimātratā Weltanschauung. It is found in




42 I say ‘roughly’ because the rāvakabhūmi paradigm also contains a non-
conceptual moment of direct perception. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact mental
process involved here, but it seems to suggest an intuitive internalisation of the
Truths rather than an entirely objectless experience.
43 The passage is known in Japanese Buddhist studies as the yuishiki-dan 唯識段
or yuishiki no kyōmon 唯識の経文.
44 This is the title according to the Tibetan translation: Byams pa’i le’u. In




For the date of the text, see Deleanu 2006, 172-176.
The rāvakabhūmi calls it the Muktakasūtra, but in modern Buddhist
studies, it is often referred to as the Revatasūtra (after the Buddha’s
interlocutor’s name).45 Speaking of the objects visualised in meditation, the
Muktakasūtra/Revatasūtra describes them as follows:
He [i.e. the contemplative] does not see the [visualised] object itself in
a non-mediated, direct manner46 but generates a replica or image
[which is] nothing but cognition, nothing but visualisation, nothing but
recollection.47





















The vijñaptimātratā thesis in the Sam
̇
dhinirmocanasūtra is likewise
pronounced in a context discussing the nature of the visualised objects in
the vipa yanā practice. Vipa yanā is defined as a reflective process which,
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45 The passage has been discussed in numerous modern contributions. Here I limit







literally mean ‘[in such a manner as if]
touching [directly], [as if] being face to face’.
47 A more literal rendering of the last part of the sentence would be ‘which is
knowing-only, seeing-only, recollection-only’. Schmithausen 2014, 499, suggests that
pratismr
̇
ta could also be construed as ‘mindful observation’.
48 ŚrBh-MS as well as ŚrBh-Sh read: samāhitam
̇
. The hypothetical emendation
above is based on Tib. nye bar gyur and Ch. 和合.









should most likely be taken here as an action
noun. See Schmithausen 2014, 499, n. 2110.
50 ŚrBh II 52.18-20; ŚrBh-MS 71a6-7; See also ŚrBh-Sh 119.15-18; Sakuma 1990 II
12.6-9 (cf. p. 109, too). Ch.: 彼雖於其本所知事，不能和合，現前觀察，然與本事相似
而生。於彼所縁 有彼相似，唯智，唯見，唯正憶念。(T 30.428b5-7). For Tib., see D
77b; P. 93b.
benefiting from the calmness brought by amatha meditation, can be
directed at images perceived in inner concentration (adhyātmasamādhigo-
carapratibimba; nang du ting nge ’dzin gyi spod yul gzugs brnyan; 内三摩地
所行影像).51 These images as well as the cognitive objects (jñeyārtha; shes
bya’i don; 所知義)52 which they represent become the focus of the yogi’s
examination (vicaya; rnam par ’byed pa; 思 擇), intense examination
(pravicaya; rab tu rnam par ’byed pa; 最極思擇), thorough inspection
(parivitarka; yong su rtog pa; 周遍尋思).53
It is at this juncture that the nature of the images meditated upon in
vipa yanā becomes an issue. Asked by Bodhisattva Maitreya whether
these images are different from the contemplating mind, the Buddha
declares them to be ‘non-different’ (abhinna; tha dad pa ma yin; 無異).
These images are, he says, representation-only (vijñaptimātra; rnam par
rig pa tsam; 唯 […]識).54 But what makes the Saṁ
dhinirmocanasūtra
special is the fact that the scope of definition is expended to all cognitive
acts:
I declare that the consciousness (vijñāna)55 is constituted (prabhāvita)
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51 Most of the reconstructions of Sanskrit terms in the Sam
̇
dhinirmocanasūtra
passages quoted here are based on Lamotte 1935. (For simplicity’s sake, I omit the
asterisk in this section.)
52 Literally, jñeya translates as ‘cognisable’.
53 See ch. VIII, § 4. (The paragraph numeration follows Lamotte ed.).
54 In the Tibetan rendering, the sentence reads: gzugs brnyan de rnam par rig pa
tsam du zad pa’i phyir te | (P Ngu 29b1; D Ca 27a4; sTog Na 38b2; Lamotte ed. 91.4-5,
§ 7; Dunhuang MS: Hakamaya 2008, 122.27-28). Ch.: 由彼影像 唯是識故。(T
16.698b2).
(NB: In the citations from and references to the Sam
̇
dhinirmocansūtra, the siglum
‘Ch.’ should be understood as referring Xuanzang’s translation into Chinese (Taishō
Canon Vol. 16, # 676). A more thorough investigation would require collating all
extant Chinese translations.)
55 Schmithausen (2014, 503) suggests a more precise, if explanatory, translation of







vadāmi.57 Tib. rnam par shes pa ni58 dmigs pa dmigs pa rnam par rig pa
tsam gyis rab tu phye ba yin no59 zhes ngas bshad do || P Ngu 29b1; D Ca
27a4; sTog Na 38b2; Lamotte ed. 91.4-5, § 7; Dunhuang MS: Hakamaya
2008, 122.28-29. Ch. 我説 : 識所縁唯60識所現故。T 16.698b2)61
The Buddha goes on explaining that ‘the inherent (prakr
̇
tistha)62 mental
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vijñāna as ‘sensory and cognitive awareness’. See Schmithausen 2014, 503; cf. note
below.
56 My translation here owes much to Schmithausen 2014, 503 (see also 400-1; et
passim). For other renderings, see Lamotte 1935, 211; Powers 1995, 155
57 The words in brackets are optional. ‘I declare(d)’ could be also reconstructed as
mayoktam or mayā de itam.
The Sanskrit reconstruction follows 衾 or rather sums up 衾 Schmithausen
2014, 395, 397-8, et passim. The philological and historical problems connected to the
so-called vijñaptimātra(tā) passage are brilliantly addressed in Schmithausen 1984
(for conclusions regarding the Skt. reconstruction, see p. 437: ＊ālambanavijñapti-
mātraprabhāvitam
̇
vijñānam ‘consciousness is characterised by [the fact that its]
object is nothing but representation’) and Schmithausen 2014, 387-505 (see also 507f.
for the meaning of prabhāvita). The latter monograph offers an extensive and
superbly argued discussion of other reconstructions and latest interpretations.
58 Lamotte ed.: pa’i. Lamotte ed. contains no note accounting for this reading. It
might be an emendation on the basis of Xuanzang’s rendering (and/or other
sources?), but nothing is said to this effect either.
59 D adds: || (i.e. double shad).
60 Song ed. [宋, in Taishō sigla], Old Song ed. [宮, in Taishō sigla]: 惟.
61 In Xuanzang’s rendering, the sentence is rather differently worded: ‘I declare
that [this is] because 故 the object [/support] of consciousness is only a
manifestation 所現 of the consciousness.’
62 Tib. rang bzhin du gnas pa literally translates ‘abiding as/in self-nature’. (Cf. Ch.
自性而住) And so would Lamotte’s Sanskrit reconstruction ＊svabhāvasthita. The
Sanskrit compound is linguistically possible, but as far as I know, it does not seem to
images (cittabimba) of the appearances (abhāsa) of visible forms (rūpa),
etc. [perceived by] sentient beings (sattva)’63 are not different (abhinna;
tha dad pa ma yin; 無異) from the mind. The fools (bāla; byis pa; 愚夫)
however, unware of the fact that these mental images are nothing but
representation (vijñaptimātra; rnam par rig pa tsam; 唯[…]識), fall into
trap of distorted cognition (viparyastacittatā; phyin ci log tu sems; 作顚倒
解).
The contemplative must, of course, fully comprehend and eventually
transcend the epistemic mechanism of the vijñaptimātratā. By ‘yoking
together’ (yuganaddha; zung du ’jug pa; 和 合 倶 轉) the insight and
tranquillity into a single act of mental one-pointedness (cittaikāgratā; sems
rtse gcig pa nyid; 心一境性), the yogi reaches a state in which:
he realises that these images (pratibimba) which pertain to the
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occur in Buddhist literature. Rang bzhin du gnas pa (or rang bzhin gyis gnas pa)
rendering prakr
̇
tistha is, on the other hand, well-attested in Buddhist, especially
Yogācāra, sources: e.g. BoBh-W 3.2; 331.12; 401.7; MSA 11.12; etc. Chandra 1994, s.v.,
also registers rang bzhin du gnas pa as equivalent to prakr
̇
tistha on the basis of the
Pravrajyāvastu. (The testimony of Chandra [1959] 1971, s.v., can be dismissed as
hypothetical since it records the compound on the basis of the same Sam
̇
dhinirmoca-
nasūtra passage under discussion here). Prakr
̇
tistha (literally, ‘naturally/spontan-
eously abiding’) means ‘inherent’, ‘original’, ‘innate’ (as well as ‘abiding in the original
state’, ‘genuine’, etc., though the latter semantic ramifications are not relevant here).
The idea conveyed by the text, whether the Sanskrit original was ＊prakr
̇
tistha
or ＊svabhāvasthita, seems to be that the mental images of phenomena are inherent
to the mind, occurring spontaneously, rather than being caused or depending on
external objects.
63 Tib. sems can rnams kyi gzugs la sogs par snang ba sems kyi gzugs brnyan rang
bzhin du gnas pa (Lamotte ed. 91, § 9); Ch. 若諸有情 自性而住 縁色等心 所行影像。
(T 16.698b9-10).
My understanding of the Tibetan is closer, though not identical, to Lamotte
1935, 212, rather than to Powers 1995, 155. Ch. is rather free but the purport is the
same.
domain of concentration (samādhigocara) are nothing but representa-
tion (vijñaptimātra), and having realised this, he contemplates
[/focuses upon](manaskaroti) the Supreme Reality (tathatā).
(Tib.: ting nge ’dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan de la ’di ni rnam par rig pa tsam
yin no zhes bya bar rtogs te | de rtogs nas de bzhin nyid du yid la byed pa gang pa
yin pa’o || Lamotte ed. 92.11-13, § 9. Ch.: 謂通達三摩地所行64影像 唯是其識，或
通達此已 復思惟如性。T 16.698b23-24)
Whether this amounts to a variety of idealism which denies categorically
the existence of objects exterior to the mind remains an issue of (often
bitterly fought) controversy. I cannot enter into details here, but no matter
what interpretation we adopt, its importance for our discussion does not
change. The rāvakabhūmi describes the nature of the visualised objects as
a mere cognitive act (jñānamātra) within the limited experience of
meditation. The Sam
̇
dhinirmocanasūtra, on the other hand, enlarges the
scope to all objects of knowledge. Whatever we perceive is representation-
only (vijñaptimātra), all ‘objects’ we see or hear are ultimately of the
essence and reducible to the mind.
4. Substitution
The fourth interpretative strategy refers to a process of semantic
transplant widely seen throughout Buddhist history, meditation being only
one of its areas of application. It involves investing establised technical
terms with new meanings.65
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64 Taishō reads: 所云. This must be a scribal (or typographical?) error for 所行＝
gocara. Cf. Ch. and Tib. translations in note 63 above.
65 This interpretative strategy has been quite prolific throughout the whole
Buddhist history. And Buddhist authors, mainly Mahāyānist and Tantric, made
extensive use of it declaring new meanings to be revelations made, more often than
Here we shall examine how the Sarvāstivādin five-step model of the
spiritual path was adopted in Yogācāra Buddhism with a complete
revamping of its semantic content. Let’s first have a brief look at the
description of the Sarvāstivādin path to Arhatship in the Abhidharmako a.
(1) After fulfilling the fundamental requirements of developing the
resolution (pran
̇
idhāna) to attain Nirvān
̇
a66 and leading a holy life in
accordance with the ethical code of the monastic Order,67
(2) the practioner embarks upon the preparatory path (prayogamār-
ga).68 This step consists in three distinct phases: (a) basic meditative
training, i.e. cultivation of the impure69 and/or mindfulness of breathing;70
(b) the four applications of mindfulness, practised in a manner similar to
the descriptions in canonical sources;71 and (c) the wholesome roots
(ku alamūla) conducive to insight (nirvedhabhāgīya) into the Noble
Truths, which continue the four applications of mindfulness,72 laying the
Reshaping Timelessness (Deleanu)20
― 357 ―
not, by the Buddha Himself. The very title of the Sam
̇
dhinirmocanasūtra, i.e. The
Scripture on the Unravelling the Hidden Meaning, hints to its semantic mission. Just
before its famous announcement of the third turning of the Wheel of Teaching
(dharmacakra), the text elaborates on the implicit meaning which requires proper
explanation (neyārtha) vs the explicit or definitive meaning (nitārtha)(see Lamotte
1935, 83-85, §§ 28-29; T 16.696c-697a).
With the advent of Tantric Buddhism, we witness even more radical examples
of semantic remodelling such as, for instance, the famous identification of the five
aggregates (pañca skandhāh
̇
) with the Five Fundamental Buddhas (e.g. Guhyasa-
mājatantra ch. XVII ver. 50, Matsunaga ed. 1978, 104, also cited in the (Tāntrika)
Āryadeva’s Caryāmelāpakapradīpa, Wedemeyer 2007, 350)
66 AKBh ch. VI ver. 24c. See also AKBh ch. III ver. 44c; ch. IV ver. 124; ch. VII ver.
30; ch. VII ver. 34.
67 AKBh p. 334.
68 See AKBh ch. VI ver. 17-25 & commentary.
69 AKBh ch. VI ver. 9-11.
70 AKBh ch. VI ver. 12-13.
71 AKBh ch. VI ver. 14-16.
72 AKBh ch. VI ver. 17-25.
emphasis on the contemplation of the Four Noble Truths in sixteen
aspects.73
(3) The third step, called the ‘path of vision’ (dar anamārga),74 is
described as the ‘realisation (abhisamaya)[leading to the] insight into the
Truths [effected] by non-contaminated wisdom’.75 This realisation will,
however, stamp out only the proclivities (anu aya) related to such







existence of a self, etc.
(4) The subtler defilements stemming from emotional attachments like
lust (rāga) and hatred (pratigha) or from our fundamental ignorance
(avidyā) can only be abandoned at the next level named the ‘path of
cultivation’ (bhāvanāmārga).76 This is a long, arduous process of meditation
on the Noble Truths which gradually eradicates all traces, no matter how
subtle, of latent proclivities.
(5) The culmination of this process is known as the ‘path requiring no
more training’ (a aiks
̇
amārga), which is the moment and state of Arhatship,
of Awakening to the Truth and Liberation from the cycle of rebirth.77
The five-step paradigm of spiritual progression was also adopted in
Yogācāra Buddhism but not without semantic substitutions. The
Mahāyānasūtrālam
̇
kāra is probably the earliest Yogācāra text which
makes use of it. Verses ( loka) 6-10 and their prose commentary
(bhās
̇
ya)78 in the Chapter on Reality (Tattvādhikāra) sketch out what will








a ākāram. (AKBh ch. VI ver. 17 b-c)
74 AKBh ch. VI ver. 25-32.
75 dar anābhisamayo ’nāsravayā prajñayā satyānām (AKBh 351.12)







o ’rhann asau tadā. (AKBh ch. VI ver. 45ab)
78 Traditionally, the authorship of the verses is attributed to Maitreya while the
commentary is, more often than not, considered to be the work of Vasubandhu. The





ya is not included in the corpus believed to have been
become the basic model of the Yogācāra spiritual ladder. In spite of a
terminology which is identical to Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika texts, the
content of each step is construed in a different manner. Let us have a look
at one example:79
The second stanza [sets forth] the abiding (avasthāna) in [the
realisation that] the manifestation of the [cognitive objects] is mind-
only (cittamātra), [realisation achieved after] having comprehended
that the objects are nothing but mental verbalisation. This is the
bodhisattva’s station of [cultivating the wholesome factors] leading to
the penetration [of the Truth] (nirvedhabhāgīyāvasthā). From this
point on, as [the yogi] reaches direct perception (pratyaks
̇
a) into the
Essence of Phenomena (dharmadhātu), [he] becomes dissociated
from the characteristic of the [cognitive] subject-object (grāhya-
grāhaka) duality.80 This is the station of the path of vision
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authored by Vaubandhu the Kośakāra (see Deleanu 2006, 186). The fact remains,
however, that the verses were compiled by person(s) different from the author the
bhās
̇
ya, which reflects a more developed stage in the history of the Yogācāra
doctrine.
79 The citation comes from the commentary (bhās
̇
ya) ad verse ( loka) 7.
80 Professor Schmithausen kindly suggested the possibility of a different reading.
If we emend pratyaks
̇
ato gamane dvaya° to pratyaks
̇
atāgamanaṁ | dvaya°, the
meaning would become: ‘Thereupon the dharmadhātu is directly perceived.(1)
[That the dharmadhātu is] dissociated from the characteristic of duality (verse
6.7d) [refers to the dissociation] from the characteristic of [the epistemic split into]
subject and object.’ The passage is actually cited as such in Jñānaśrīmitra’s













ena viyukto is syntactically
connected with the preceding sentence by introducing the relative pronoun yo
(referring to dharmadhātu). The suggestion is certainly worth considering,
especially if we suppose Jñānaśrīmitra cited the sentence from a textual version
closer to the original rather than rephrased it for exegetical purposes. Tentatively, I
(dar anamārgāvasthā).






















The direct perception into the Essence of Phenomena is then explained as
abiding in the realisation that even mind-only does not exist since without a
cognised object there can be no cognising subject (cittamātrasya
nāstitvāvagamanam
̇
grāhyābhāve grāhakābhāvāt).82 And the station of the
path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārgāvasthā), which also is equated to the
transformation of the basis of existence (ā rayaparivartana), consists in the
attainment of the undifferentiated state (samatā) of Reality by means of
non-conceptual cognition (avikalpajñāna).83
Similar structural categories are thus revamped to accommodate new
philosophical ideals and praxis paradigms. The largely reflective medita-
tion directed at the internalisation of the Four Truths in the traditional
approach is replaced with contemplative practices aiming at the non-
conceptual cognition of the undifferentiated Supreme Reality and resting
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stick, however, to Lévi’s edition since the emendation would not alter the basic
meaning of the sentence.
(1) Literally, ‘becomes pratyaks
̇
a＝is directly manifest’, pratyaks
̇
a being used




kāra, Lévi ed. 24.9-12. Cf. Ch.: 釋曰：此偈顯第二通達分位。
由解一切諸義唯是意言為性。則了一切諸義悉是心光。菩薩爾時名善住唯識。從彼後
現見法界。了達所有二相。即解脱能執所執。(T 31. 599a15-18).
82 MSA reads grāhyabhāve. I emend together with Limaye 1992, 73. See also Ch. 所
取 物 無 故 as well as Ui’s translation into Japanese (1961b, 110). For entire
commentary ad loka 8, see MSA 24.12-16.
83 For the bhās
̇
ya ad loka 9, see MSA 24.16-20.
upon the idealist presupposition that the objects of ordinary perception are
nothing by mind.84
Epilogue
History: In or Beyond?
The fact that Buddhism has found various ways to interpret and redesign
its meditative repertoire is not a weakness. It attests to flexibility and
openness to diversity, an attitude which is often seen in its inclusivistic
approach. In the case of Yogācāra Buddhism, for instance, we see the spirit
of inclusivism in the encyclopaedic Yogācārabhūmi treatise which
embraces various meditative traditions. A similar attitude is also displayed
by Kumārajīva (ca 339-409)85 in his anthology dedicated to contemplative
practice known as the Zuochan sanmei jing 坐禪三昧經 or The Scripture on
the Concentration of Sitting Meditation (＊Dhyānasamādhisūtra?).86 It is
true that the inclusivistic approach is rarely, if ever, impartial. Quite often it
reflects hierarchic patterns. Kumārajīva’s Zuochan sanmei jing symptoma-
tically states that ‘those whose wisdom regarding [the essence of]
phenomena [/essential factors of reality] (dharma) is shallow are called
Arhats, those [whose wisdom] is intermediate are called Solitary Buddhas
(pratyekabuddha), and those [whose wisdom] is profound are called
Buddhas’ (於諸法中, 智慧淺入名阿羅漢。中入名辟支佛。深入名佛。T 15.
281a7-8). And a similar view is professed by countless Mahāyāna sources.
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84 For the use of ‘idealism’ in relation to Yogācāra Buddhism, see Addendum III.
85 Kumārajīva’s dates are not known with precision. 344-413, 350-409, etc. have
also been put forward. See Kamata 1983, 213-226.
86 The Zuochan sanmei jing is largely based on original Indic sources translated
by Kumārajīva at the request of his Chinese disciples. Although it probably reflects
syncretic approaches current in Northwestern India and/or Serindia, the work as
such is the product of Kumārajīva’s editorial efforts, with possible exegetical/autho-
rial contributions. (The text is also accessible in English translation thanks to
Yamabe and Sueki 2009).
In spite of its hierarchical partiality, this inclusivistic paradigm strikes a
chord with our modern Zeitgeist.
This degree of openness and flexibility should not, however, be confused
with an understanding of history similar to modern secular views.
Whatever particular form they may take, the latter are usually based upon
historicist presuppositions. Historicism87 itself has been formulated in
different ways, but the mainstream understanding is best described by the
following definition given by Thornhill (1998):
Historicism defined as ‘the affirmation that life and reality are history
alone’ by Benedetto Croce ([History as the Story of Liberty] 1938:65),
[…] is an insistence on the historicity of all knowledge and cognition
[…]. It is intended as a critique of the normative, allegedly anti-
historical, epistemologies of Enlightenment thought, expressly Kant.
[…][One of its main assumptions is] that the truth-content of
cognition is dependent not on categorical logic, but upon its
situatedness in, and constant attentiveness to, history.
This is not the way traditional Buddhism understands the relation between
history and Truth, including the teachings and practices leading to it.
Does then Buddhism totally lack a historical perspective on the way
teachings and practices are transmitted? There seem to be only two
traditional models attempting a more or less ‘historical’ approach to
doctrinal change.88 The first one is the periodisation of the Buddha’s
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87 The concept is also referred to as ‘historism’ and, less frequently, as ‘historicity’.
88 I do not take into consideration here the Buddhist historiographical (or rather
historico-hagiographical) literature represented by such genres as the Vam
̇
sas in
Pali, Chos ’byungs in Tibetan, zhuans 傳 in Chinese, etc. Although they display
(albeit not constantly and consistently) criteria similar to modern historiography,
such texts are not canonical and therefore not representative of the core
missionary activity. This was one of the most convenient and prolific
hermeneutical tools accounting for the plurality (often of a contradictory
nature) of the Buddhist teachings and scriptures. The paradigmatic
scriptural model is provided by the Sam
̇
dhinirmocanasūtra.89 The text
proclaims that the Buddha turned the Dharma-Wheel (chos kyi ’khor lo
[…] rab tu bskor), i.e. expounded the basic tenets, three times, each
revealing a deeper layer of Truth.90 The first time, he taught the Four
Noble Truths for the benefit of the Śrāvakayāna followers. The second
time, he set forth the doctrines of emptiness of no intrinsic essence, no
arising, no passing away, etc. for the sake of Mahāyāna followers. The
revelation, however, was made in statements whose ultimate meaning
requires to be determined (＊neyārtha; drang ba’i don). It was at the third
turning of the Dharma-Wheel that he taught the definitive meaning
(＊nītārtha; nges pa’i don) of emptiness, sense which is (of course!)
conveyed by the Sam
̇
dhinirmocanasūtra.91
The second ‘historical’ approach is the idea that the teaching ( āsana) of
each Buddha is doomed to a cycle of deterioration. Typically, it starts with a
period when the True Dharma (saddharma; dam pa’i chos; 正法) thrives
during the lifetime of a Buddha. After the Buddha passes into the
parinirvān
̇
a, the teaching loses its former vigour entering the period of the
‘semblance Dharma’ (saddharmapratirūpaka; dam pa’i chos kyi gzugs
brnyan; 像 法). Finally, the True Teaching enters its latter days
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philosophical outlook of the Buddhist tradition.
89 The model was also famous in Tibetan Buddhism (see, for instance, Bu-ston’s
Chos ’byung; cf. Obermiller [1932] 1996, 53-54).
90 Tib.: Lamotte ed. ch. VII, § 30 (pp. 85-6); cf. Ch.: T 16.697a-b.
91 This periodisation formula will enjoy huge popularity in East Asian Buddhism,
contributing to the formation of such elaborate doctrinal classifications 教判 as ‘the
teachings of the five periods’ 五時教 or ‘the five periods and eight teachings’ 五時八
教 in the Tiantai/Tendai tradition 天台宗 and ‘the five teachings and ten principles’
五教十宗 in the Huayan/Kegon school 華嚴宗.
experiencing increasing decay and finally annihilation (saddharmavipralo-
pa; dam pa’i chos rab tu rnam pa ’jig pa; 末法).92
Both approaches are, however, a far cry from the way secular historians
look at the doctrinal and textual change. They could at best be described as
‘quasi-historical’ attempts which do not rest upon historicist presupposi-
tions. This does not mean that they do not function within the traditional
Buddhist paradigm. And my discussion here is not meant to deny the right
of existence of this paradigm in the modern world. I only wish to highlight
its peculiar nature. To my (historicist) mind, the only problematic issue is
the attempt to combine the traditional and modern paradigms in an
unsystematic, inconsistent way, to talk about the timelessness of a subject
while professing to examine its ‘history’ or presenting it as satisfying
empirical criteria.
I hope this paper does not muddle paradigms and criteria. It is, once
again, based upon historicist premises and attempts to tackle meditation as
described in primary sources from a philologico-historical viewpoint. The
conclusion yielded by this attempt is that meditation is as firmly anchored
in historicity as any other mental state. Far from being an ahistorical black-
box, it is a permeable process subject to a wide range of factors from
personal psychological profiles to large cultural paradigms. This in itself is
not a flaw or weakness but it does not guarantee claims that contemplative
states are ‘pure’ or ‘beyond history’.
Addendum I
We shall look here only at just a handful of sources stating the timelessness
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92 The idea exists in various hues and shapes in both Mainstream and Mahāyāna
Buddhism. Even a sketchy sketch would not, however, do justice to its complexity.
For an excellent monograph, focusing on the Buddhist prophecy of decline known as
the ‘Kausambi Story’, see Nattier 1991.
and universality of the Buddhist Teaching, praxis included. They come
from different ages and traditions attesting to the centrality of the motif
throughout Buddhist history.
The idea is already found in the early Canon. According to a famous
stanza in the Sam
̇
yuttanikāya, the Buddhas of the past, present, and future
dwelled, dwell, and will dwell in as well as revere the True Dharma
(saddhamma). And the scripture concludes, ‘this is the Universal Norm of
[all] the Buddhas’ (esā buddhānam
̇
dhammatā).93
Similarly, the fact that all conditioned phenomena (saṅkhārā) are
impermanent (aniccā), begetting suffering (dukkhā), and no (n)-Self
(anattā),94 remains a [universal] principle (dhātu), the lasting nature
(t
̇
hitatā) of the truth (dhamma), the fixed course (niyāmatā) of the truth





arīkasūtra, the Truth (dharma) [of the Single
Vehicle (ekayāna)] revealed by the Buddhas is likewise described as
having a lasting nature (dharmasthitim
̇
), fixed course (dharmaniyāma-
tām
̇






93 Ye ca atītā sambuddhā, ye ca buddhā anāgatā |





su viharanti ca |
Atho pi viharissanti, esā buddhānam
̇
dhammatā || (SN I 140.10-14)
94 In the Pali tradition, these are called the ‘three distinctive marks’ (tilakkhan
̇
a)
of the Buddhist teaching. In East Asian Buddhism, they are usually known as the
‘three Dharma-seals’ 三法印.











hitatā dhammaniyāmatā. Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā. […] Sabbe
saṅkhārā dukkhā. […] Sabbe dhammā anattā. […](AN I 286). The precise sense of




hitatā dhammaniyāmatā is not exactly clear, and
neither are the glosses in the traditional Pali commentaries. Cf. also Woodward







loki imām akampyām |
Key practices leading to the supreme Truth can also appear qualified as
universal or uniquely superior. In such cases, the implication is that they
function beyond historical limitations or personal peculiarities.
In the Sam
̇
dhinirmocanasūtra, the Buddha ends his exposition of the
tranquillity-insight ( amathavipa yanā 止觀) practice by declaring it to be
the perfect and pure path of spiritual cultivation (＊yogamārga; rnal ’byor
kyi lam; 瑜伽道) which was taught by the Buddhas of the past and will be
taught by the Buddhas of the future.97
In the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, the yogi who succeeds in abandoning all mental
images [/constructs] (nimitta) and reaches an imageless state (nirābhā-
sam
̇
[…] bhavet)98 is blessed by the Buddhas coming from all lands.99 The
sutra also refers to its doctrines and practices as representing the
teachings of the Buddhas of the past, present, and future.100

















yanti upāyakau alam ||
(Kern and Nanjio ed. 53.9-10; Wogihara and Tsuchida ed. 51.19-21; ch. II, ver. 103)
Ch. 是法住法位 世間相常住
於道場知已 導師方便説 (T 9.9b10-11)
(Cf. preceding stanza, too.)
97 Tib.: Lamotte ed. ch. VIII, § 39, p. 120. Ch.: T 16.703a11.
98 Śiks
̇
















iro hi tasya mārjanti nimittam
̇




悉引光明手 而摩是人頂 (T 16.602b1-4; Śiks
̇
ānanda’s Chinese translation)
100 E.g. Nanjio ed. 1923 [1956], 1; 98 (passage subsequent to the verse cited above);
260; etc.
101 Skt. title according to a rather unclear transliteration (P Gi 10a; D 293b).







po nges par bsdu ba), the Mādhyamika-cum-Tāntrika master Atīśa (982-
1054) gives a succinct description of the bodhisattva path which he
declares to be ‘the essence preached by the Buddhas of the three periods
[i.e. the past, present, and future]’ (dus gsum sangs rgyas kyis gsung pa’i |
snying po […]’.102
To change the cultural landscape, similar ideas are also seen in Dōgen’s
道 元 (1200-1253) works. In his (symptomatically entitled) Universal
Recommendation of the Method of Sitting Meditation 普勸坐禪儀, the
Japanese Zen master tells that all accomplished practioners, whether of our
cosmic realm or others, whether from India or China, equally have the
Buddha-seal and have devoted themselves only to the zazen practice 唯務
打坐.103 The latter is identical with the shikan taza 只管打坐 or ‘single-
minded meditation’, the paramount means and goal in Dōgen’s teachings.
And in the (substantially different) redaction of the same work,104 Dōgen
declares that basically there are no differences in the Buddha’s teachings,
whether it is in this or other cosmic realms (凡其自界他方 佛法本無異法。
T 82.2a21-22).
Addendum II
The five basic techniques of meditation discussed in Section 1 was a
popular combinatory formula found in many Northern schools of Indian
Buddhism, first and foremost, in Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogā-
cāra.105 They will become even more popular in East Asian Buddhism,
where they are mainly known as ‘the five contemplations for stilling the
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102 For Tib. text, see Sherburne 2003, 374. A similar verse is found in the sNying po
bsdu ba (id. 368).
103 凡夫自界他方 西天東地 等持佛印, 一檀宗風, 唯務打坐。(T 82.1b13-14)
104 Preserved at the Komazawa University Library (see T 82 1, n. 2).
105 For a detailed study of these five meditative techniques, see Ōminami 1977.
mind’ 五停心觀.106
Let us look again at the set in the rāvakabhūmi, which is one of the
earliest sources attesting the combinatory formula, adding the recom-
mended categories of practioners for each meditation. This suggests that
the neophytes were not supposed to master the entire set. It rather
appears that they were taught only one particular technique in accordance
to the dominant proclivity affecting each individual’s psyche.107
(1) Meditation on impurity (a ubhā) 不淨觀, recommended for meditators
dominated by sensual passion [/lust](rāgacarita) 貪欲.
(2) Meditation on friendliness (maitrī) 慈悲觀, for meditators dominated
by hatred (dve acarita) 瞋恚.
(3) Meditation on dependent origination (idam
̇
pratyayatāpratītyasamutpā-
da) 因縁觀, for meditators dominated by bewilderment (mohacarita)
愚癡.
(4) Analysis of the elements [of existence](dhātuprabheda) 界分別觀,108
for meditators dominated by arrogance (mānacarita) 我慢 (我見).
(5) Mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasmr
̇
ti) 數息觀,109 for meditators
dominated by restless thoughts (vitarkacarita) 散亂心.
This is not, however, the only combinatory and terminological formula.
There are other patterns, too, one of them being ‘the five types of
meditation’ 五門禪.110 The latter consists of the same members as the set
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106 See Huiyuan’s 浄影寺慧遠 (523-592) Meanings and Writs of the Great Vehicle
大乘義章 (T 44.697c); Zhiyi’s 智顗 (538-597) Arcane of Meaning of the Lotus Sutra
法華玄義 (T 33.707c, 786a), Great Tranquillity and Insight 摩訶止觀 (T 46.35c, 51b,
117b), etc.
107 See ŚrBh-TG II 50.14-52.10; ŚrBh-Sh 198.12-199.9; also ŚrBh-TG II 58.7ff.; ŚrBh-
Sh 202.3ff. For a more detailed discussion, see Deleanu 2012.
108 Also rendered as 六界觀, 界方便觀, etc.
109 Also rendered as 持息念、安那般那念、安般念, etc.
110 This is a set apparently originating with the so-called ‘meditation scriptures’ 禪
經, a corpus of texts surviving mainly in Chinese translation and/or compiled in
above with one exception. It replaces the analysis of the elements
(dhātuprabheda) with the Buddha recollection (buddhānusmr
̇
ti) 念佛觀,111
which is recommended to meditators equally 等分 afflicted by lust, hatred,
bewilderment, and restless thoughts.112
Addendum III
Qualifying Yogācāra Buddhism as ‘idealistic’ will surely make (quite?) a
few learned eyebrows rise. The academic community is far from having
achieved consensus on the proper terminology describing the philosophy of
the school. A growing number of scholars in the West (e.g. Lusthaus 2002)
as well as the East (e.g. Shiba 2003) argue that Yogācāra is far closer to
phenomenology.
My understanding of the classical Yogācāra philosophy113 (intrinsically
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China (more or often than not on the basis of Indian sources). Their scholastic
affiliation is difficult to pinpoint, but roughly speaking, they tend to mix a large dose
of Śrāvakayāna (often Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika) doctrines and practices with
Mahāyāna elements.
The rendering ‘five types of meditation’ hinges on construing 門 as ‘category’ or
‘method’, rather than ‘gate’. I adopt the former but if the latter meaning was
intended, the translation should be ‘the five meditations [serving as] gateway [to
the path toward the Awakening]’. Cf. the term avatāramukha ‘gateways for the
entrance [to the path]’ in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BoBh-W 110.21-22 and 25). The
latter compound is translated into Chinese by Xuanzang as 趣入門 (T 31.504b).
Note, however, that the Bodhisattvabhūmi does not use the numeral ‘five’ although
this is the number of techniques referred to here.
111 The Zuochan sanmei jing 坐禪三昧經 calls it the ‘bodhisattva concentration on
the Buddha recollection’ 菩薩念佛三昧 (T 15.281b25).
112 This is the antidote prescribed in the Zuochan sanmei jing (若多婬欲人, 不淨法
門治。若多瞋恚人, 慈心法門治。若多愚癡人, 思惟觀因縁法門治。若多思覺人, 念息
法門治。若多等分人, 念佛法門治。T 15.281c2-5). Other meditation scriptures
prescribe it, however, for other types of affliction.
113 I understand ‘classical Yogācāra’ as referring to the subtly different but
linked to my labelling it ‘idealism’) is along the same lines advocated by the
excellent study of Birgit Kellner and John Taber (2014)(also containing a
survey of the scholarly discussions on the subject). As for the term
‘idealism’, I follow the definition given by the British philosopher Timothy
L.S. Sprigge (1998):
Idealism is now usually understood in philosophy as the view that mind
is the most basic reality and that the physical world exists only as an
appearance to or expression of mind, or as somehow mental in its inner
essence. However, a philosophy which makes the physical world
dependent upon mind is usually also called idealist even if it postulates
some further hidden, more basic reality behind the mental and
physical scenes (for example, Kant’s things-in-themselves).
The classical Yogācāra philosophy seems to match the definition, albeit
in a unique way. The problem underlying a lexeme like ‘idealism’ is that it
denotes a wide genus whose semantic sphere includes numerous species
and subspecies. The ‘Yogācāra species’ of idealism is not completely
identical with the Platonic idealism or Berkeley’s idealist philosophy.
Actually, depending on the semantic scale at which you set your
judgements, you may also say that they represent different philosophies.
But when looking from a more encompassing perspective, they can be seen
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kindred strains of philosophy which start with the texts (mostly verses) ascribed to
Maitreya (mid-4th century), is systematised by the Asaṅga (ca 330-405) and
Vasubandhu (ca 350-430, and continue with such exegetes as Sthiramati and
Dharmapāla in the 6th century. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, when expressing their
ontological views (the former more than the latter), can also be regarded as roughly
belonging to the classical period. This phase comes to an end with the rise and
dominance of the Hybrid Yogācāra-Madhyamaka current(s) represented by
Jñānagarbha (ca 700-760), Śāntaraks
̇
ita (ca 725-788), Kamalaśīla (ca 740-795), etc.
in the 8th century.
as sharing enough similarities to come under the definition above.
There is, hence, no harm in comparing and finding similarities between
Yogācāra and phenomenology. And I believe that some points of similitude
exist such as, for instance, those between the non-conceptual forms of
Yogācāra meditation and the phenomenological ideal of epoché. But there
are also other areas in which their approach is quite different.
Overemphasising the similarities in an attempt to accommodate Yogācāra
under a phenomenological umbrella is a Procrustean approach. But even if
the phenomenological reading of Yogācāra were correct, it would not
change my label of ‘idealist’. To my mind, the unwarranted (almost
mystical) belief in intuitive knowledge seen in phenomenology (especially
in its Husserlian and Heideggerian varieties) is a type of idealism.
What further complicates our understanding and labelling the Yogācāra
philosophy is that its tenets are often stated in relation to spiritual and
soteriological ideals (like most other Buddhist schools, for that matter).
Actually, the very term ‘representation-only’ (vijñaptimātratā or vijñapti-
mātratva) is used with a double, if closely connected, meaning. At one level,
it is a convenient, if not perfect, description of the reality as seen by
ordinary people (pr
̇
thagjana): the objects which they perceive as external
to the mind are merely products of their wrong representation. In this
sense, vijñaptimātratā is an epistemological/ontological descriptor. But on a
higher, spiritual level, this descriptor is itself incorrect and non-functioning
＝ non-existent. At this higher semantic dimension, the vijñaptimātratā
becomes the platform for its own denial. Verses 25 to 30 in Vasubandhu’s
Vijñaptimātrātāsiddhi make this abundantly clear.114 Equally revealing is
the discussion of the Mahāyānasūtrālam
̇
kāra in Section 4 above.
I would therefore suggest that the term ‘self-deconstructing subjective
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114 For critical Sanskrit and Tibetan editions of the mūla-text and Sthiramati’s
bhās
̇
ya, see Buescher 2007, 132-143.
idealism’ might work as a species descriptor for the classical Yogācāra
philosophy.
ABBREVIATIONS
Citations of and references to Pali sources are done according to the
following model: SN III 174.3 stands for Sam
̇
yuttanikāya, volume III, page
174, line 3. (For Pali sources, whose titles have been abbreviated according
to the widely accepted conventions detailed in the Epilegomena to Vol. I of
A Critical Pāli Dictionary, I refer to the PTS editions.)
Citations of and references to Sanskrit sources are done according to the
following model: AKBh 351.12 stands for the Abhidharmako abhās
̇
ya, page
351, line 12. Alternatively, I refer to the verse rather than to the page. Thus,
AKBh ch. VI ver. 17 b-c stands for the Abhidharmako abhās
̇
ya, chapter VI,
verse (kārikā) 17, second and third quarter.
Citations of and references to Tibetan translations are done according to
the following model: D Wi 111a1 stands for the sDe-dge Canon, volume Wi
(i.e. traditional Tibetan numeration), folio 111, recto, line 1.
Citations of and references to Chinese translations are done according to
the following model: T 30.527b16 stands for the Taishō Canon, volume 30,
page 527, segment b (middle segment), column 16.
AbhSam＝Abhidharmasamuccaya (see Pradhan 1950)
AbhSamBh＝Abhidharmasamuccayabhās
̇
ya (see Tatia 1976)
AKBh: Abhidharmako abhās
̇


















asāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā (see Wogihara 1932-1935)
BHS: Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit
BoBh-D: Bodhisattvabhūmi (see Dutt 1978)
BoBh-W Bodhisattvabhūmi (Wogihara [1936] 1971)
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C: Co-ne edition of the bsTan ‘gyur
Ch.: Chinese translation
D: sDe-dge edition of the Tibetan Canon (see Takasaki et al. 1980)
DaBh-K: Da abhūmikasūtra (see Kondō 1936)
DaBh-R: Da abhūmikasūtra (see Rahder 1926)




kāra (see Lévi 1907)
MW: Monier-Williams [1899] 1986.
N: sNar-thang edition of the bsTan ‘gyur
P: Peking edition of the Tibetan Canon (see Suzuki 1955-1961)
PW: Böhtlingk and Roth [1855-1875] 1990.
Skt.: Sanskrit original
ŚrBh-MS: rāvakabhūmi Manuscript (see Taishō University and China
Library of Nationalities facsimile edition 1994)
ŚrBh-Sh: rāvakabhūmi (see Shukla 1973)
ŚrBh-TG II (see Shōmon ji Kenkyū-kai 2007)
ŚrBh-TG # 22: rāvakabhūmi (see Shōmon ji Kenkyū-kai [＝Taishō Group
of Research on the rāvakabhūmi] 2008)
sTog: sTog pa Palace edition of the Tibetan Canon
T: Taishō Canon (see Takakusu and Watanabe [1922-1933] 1991)
Tib.: Tibetan translation















ī (see Takahashi 2005)
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